Last One Out Wins: Trade Policy in an International Exit Game
研究政府干预如何影响国际行业中企业退出的顺序和时机，发现政府无法预先承诺政策时会产生动态不一致问题，关税干预会提前终止市场运营并可能逆转退出顺序，在固定成本差异大时降低福利。
This paper examines the effect of government intervention on the order and timing of firm exit in an international industry with fixed costs and declined demand. A dynamic inconsistency problem arises when the government is unable to precommit to a path of policy: it always intervenes to prolong the viability of the firm located in its market, even when the firm's survival is not the socially optimal outcome. The effect of tariff intervention is in all cases to terminate market operation prematurely, and in many cases to reverse the order of firm exit. Intervention in the absence of precommittment is never first best, and actually reduces welfare relative to the free market equilibrium when the differential between firms' fixed costs is large.