Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure
研究经理在重复廉价谈话博弈中自愿披露私有信息的可信度，发现当经理有耐心、会计报告能有效评估披露真实性且评估期足够长时，经理几乎总是如实披露。
I examine the credibility of a manager's disclosure of privately observed nonverifiable information to an investor in a repeated cheap-talk game setting. In the single-period game no communication occurs. In the repeated game, however, the manager almost always truthfully reveals his private information provided the manager is sufficiently patient, the accounting report is sufficiently useful for assessing the truthfulness of the manager's voluntary disclosure, and the manager's disclosure performance is evaluated over a sufficiently long period. These factors may explain a manager's propensity to release private information to investors.