A Theory of Signalling During Job Search, Employment Efficiency, and "Stigmatised" Jobs
解释为何高技能失业者不愿接受临时低技能工作：因高生产率工人更看重快速重返技能岗位，且求职策略可传递生产率信号，导致过多在职搜寻、过少接受临时工作，最优政策需补贴临时低技能岗位。
This paper discusses why redundant skilled workers may be reluctant to accept interim unskilled jobs. If skilled work is more satisfying or less arduous for highly productive workers, then such workers invest more in moving quickly between skilled jobs. Thus, high productivity workers tend to search on-the-job, and if unemployed will specialise in job search, rather than take an interim position. If individual differences in productivity are known to the worker but not the potential employer, then search strategy may be used as a productivity signal, with more than the efficient proportion of workers searching on-the-job and too few accepting interim unskilled jobs. Optimal policy requires a subsidy on interim unskilled jobs.