The Bounded Rationality Bias in Managerial Valuation of Real Options: Theory and Evidence from IT Projects*
研究了管理者在评估实物期权时是否存在系统性偏差，发现他们仅在项目易量化收益低时才将期权与价值关联，收益高时则忽略。
ABSTRACT Although real options theory normatively suggests that managers should associate real options with project value, little field research has been conducted to test whether they suffer from systematic biases in doing so. We draw on the notion of bounded rationality in managerial decision making to explore this understudied phenomenon. Using data collected from managers in 88 firms, we show that managers exhibit what we label the bounded rationality bias in their assessments: They associate real options with value only when a project's easily quantifiable benefits are low, but fail to do so when they are high. The study also contributes the first set of empirical measures for all six types of real options. The study contributes to managerial practice by identifying the conditions under which managers must be vigilant about inadvertently neglecting real options and by providing a simple approach for assessing real options in technology development projects.