Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts
研究两家企业与独立工会谈判时，不完全劳动力市场合同可能优于完全合同，且经济可能陷入不完全合同均衡，为完全合同未被采用提供战略原因，并提出区分两者的可检验预测。
In a model of strategic R&D competition between two firms that negotiate with independent unions we show that: (i) incomplete labour market contracts may Pareto‐dominate complete labour market contracts (ii) even when complete contracts Pareto‐dominate incomplete contracts, economies can get stuck in the incomplete contract equilibrium. These conclusions provide additional strategic reasons why complete labour market contracts may not be used—even if they were feasible. We propose two testable predictions to discriminate between complete and incomplete contracts: (i) the variance of wages is lower with complete contracts; (ii) the variance of employment is higher under complete contracts.