Syndication of Venture Capital Investment: The Art of Resource Pooling
研究了机构风险投资者在资助初创企业时进行联合投资的逻辑，揭示了纯风险投资公司与其他投资者在种子期和后续阶段的分工，以及基于互惠原则的非正式关系规则。
This article explores the rationale of syndications of institutional venture capital investors when they fund start–ups. There is an implicit labor division between institutional venture capital investors in which pure venture capital firms are in charge of converting investment uncertainty into risk by funding the seed stage of start–ups. The other investors invest in the following stages to sustain the start–ups‘ development. Relationships between investors are also handled following informal rules. Exchanges between institutional venture capital investors are based on a reciprocity that follows the informal principles of the gift exchange theory.