AUCTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
详细介绍了拍卖理论，从标准拍卖分析到对称私人价值拍卖的通用解，并扩展到风险厌恶、多单位拍卖、合谋、最优拍卖及共同价值拍卖中的赢家诅咒问题，最后给出应用实例。
Abstract. This is a detailed introduction to auction theory. It begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules. The basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion, multi‐unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion. Then follows an introduction to optimal auctions, with and without stochastic entry, and to common value auctions and the winner's curse problem. The survey closes with a sample of applications, from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market.