Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital
研究存在代理和监督成本时风险资本分阶段投资的结构，发现资产越无形、增长机会越多、资产专用性越高，代理成本预期越高，风险资本更集中于早期和高科技公司，并更频繁监督。
ABSTRACT This paper examines the structure of staged venture capital investments when agency and monitoring costs exist. Expected agency costs increase as assets become less tangible, growth options increase, and asset specificity rises. Data from a random sample of 794 venture capital‐backed firms support the predictions. Venture capitalists concentrate investments in early stage and high technology companies where informational asymmetries are highest. Decreases in industry ratios of tangible assets to total assets, higher market‐to‐book ratios, and greater R&D intensities lead to more frequent monitoring. Venture capitalists periodically gather information and maintain the option to discontinue funding projects with little probability of going public.