Dynamic Agency with Feedback
委托人希望代理人反复击中一个随机变化的目标，但代理人只关心另一个无关过程。委托人通过发送信号影响代理人行为，最优信号会导致代理人劳动高度序列相关，对管理激励和经济周期理论有实证意义。
A principal has a stochastically evolving target that he wishes an agent to repeatedly hit with his effort. The agent does not obtain utility from hitting the target and therefore attempts to shirk; the agent's utility is determined by a second process that symmetrically is of no use to the principal. The principal cannot control effort or payoffs but can transmit signals to the agent, who is relatively uninformed. The principal's optimal signal may cause the agent's labor to be highly serially correlated. This serial correlation has empirical relevance for the theory of managerial incentives and for the theory of business cycle fluctuations.