律师的胜诉酬金:一项经济分析

Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis

RAND Journal of Economics · 1993
被引 136
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

分析信息不对称下,胜诉酬金如何让客户和律师分别通过固定费用与提成比例的选择来传递案件质量或自身能力信号。

Abstract

When there is asymmetric information, contingent fees can allow clients to signal the qualities of their cases and attorneys to signal the quality of their advice. Thus, a well-informed client who has a high-quality case will be willing to pay a relatively high fixed fee and a relatively low contingency percentage, while a client with a low-quality case will prefer a low fixed fee and a high contingency percentage. In contrast, a well-informed high-quality attorney will signal her ability by working for a relatively high contingency percentage.

信息不对称风险代理费案件质量信号律师能力信号