Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
研究产品域上的策略证明社会选择函数，证明若偏好是严格排序且可分离且域足够丰富，则函数必可分解；还刻画了自由意志主义社会选择函数，并指出顶可分离域的超集不存在策略证明的非独裁函数。
We consider strategyproof social choice functions defined over product domains. If preferences are strict orderings and separable, then strategyproof social choice functions must be decomposable provided that the domain of preferences is rich. We provide several characterization results in the case where preferences are separable only with respect to the elements of some partition of the set of components and these partitions vary across individuals. We characterize the libertarian social choice function and show that no superset of the tops separable domain admits strategyproof nondictatorial social choice functions.