Equilibrium Unemployment and the Efficient Job-Finding Rate
构建了一个劳动力市场模型，其中失业由劳动力流动和招聘过程产生，企业的招聘政策通过声誉影响求职者的找到工作概率，并得出均衡失业率是有效的结论。
A model of the labor market is constructed in which unemployment is generated by labor turnover and the process of selecting new recruits. Firms' recruitment policies affect workers' job-finding probabilities and are known to job seekers by reputation. The value of visiting a firm thus depends on the probability of being hired as well as on the terms of employment and, in equilibrium, is equal at all firms. The principal results obtained are that the equilibrium unemployment rate is efficient and that there are no external effects of search by workers or recruitment by firms.