The Gains from Differentiated Policies to Control Stock Pollution when Producers Are Heterogeneous
推导了针对异质性生产者控制存量污染问题的最优投入税，并比较了次优政策与最优政策的效率差异。基于加州排水问题的数值例子显示，最优政策相比无干预有显著效率收益，但次优干预会损失大部分收益。
Abstract We derive optimal input taxes to control stock pollution problems generated by heterogeneous agents. The taxes vary over time and in response to differences of asset quality and technology choice. We also derive second‐best policies and compare them to the efficient policy and also among themselves. Different policies will affect the timing for when, and the extent to which, conservation technologies are adopted. A numerical example, based on the California drainage problem, shows significant efficiency gains from the optimal policy compared to no intervention, but much of the gains are lost with second‐best interventions. The gains from optimal policies do not always increase with the degree of heterogeneity.