On the Use of Ceiling-Price Commitments by Monopolists
研究垄断者设定一个可讨价还价的最高限价（标价）这一常见销售做法，刻画了最优限价，并证明在顾客逐一到达、需支付个性化检查成本才能了解自身支付意愿的情形下，该机制在所有激励相容机制中是最优的。
The establishment of an asking, or ceiling, price from which reductions can be bargained is a common selling practice. For a monopolist seller of a single object, this article characterizes the best such ceiling price and shows that its use is optimal among all incentive-compatible mechanisms in a class of situations characterized by customers (1) who arrive one at a time and so do not compete with other directly and (2) who learn their idiosyncratic willingnesses to pay only by incurring idiosyncratic inspection costs.