Non-Uniform Pricing, Output and Welfare under Monopoly
垄断者通过非统一定价（价格随购买量变化）可能获得更高利润，但利润最大化与福利最大化的定价方案通常不一致，因此监管可能改善市场绩效。本文探讨在监管者信息有限的情况下，能否以总产出水平衡量市场绩效，并推导福利随总产出单调变化的条件。
A monopolist may earn greater profits by setting a nonuniform price schedule (one in which the price varies with the quantity purchased) than by charging a uniform price. In general, the profit maximizing non-uniform price schedule and the welfare maximizing schedule do not coincide. Thus, there may be scope for improving market performance through regulation. The paper considers a regulator who has limited information and authority. The issues addressed centre around the question of whether the level of total market output can be taken as a measure of market performance. Conditions under which welfare is a monotonic function of the level of total output are derived.