Efficiency Properties of Large Dynamic Markets
研究无限重复古诺市场在需求和生产部门复制时的稳态完美均衡渐近性质，给出近似竞争和效率的条件，以及过度竞争和有限竞争的条件。
This paper considers an infinitely-repeated Cournot market with discounting. It studies the asymptotic properties of stationary perfect equilibria in such a market when the demand and production sectors are replicated indefinitely. Specifically, the paper establishes (1) necessary and sufficient conditions for the approximate competitiveness and efficiency of stationary perfect equilibria, (2) necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of excessive competition and for the presence of limited competition at some stationary perfect equilibria, and (3) conditions for approximately competitive stationary perfect equilibria to be approximately efficient. The analysis focuses on the case where the market discount factor is close to unity. Copyright 1989 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.