Dynamics of Performance-Measurement Systems
回顾委托代理多任务文献，讨论绩效测量在公共组织中可能引发博弈等非预期反应，提出一个演化模型解释组织如何随时间管理绩效指标，并用职业培训项目数据验证。
We review the principal--agent multi-tasking literature and discuss the relevance of this literature to the implementation of performance measurement in public organizations. Arguably, the most important lesson from the literature is that performance measurement may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. We propose an evolutionary model of how organizations manage performance measures when gaming is revealed over time. The model stresses the dynamic nature of the performance-measure selection process--a feature that has been overlooked in the literature. We present evidence from a job training programme that is consistent with the model and we discuss implications for the selection of performance measures. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.