Cournot Equilibrium with Imperfectly Appropriable R&D
研究了知识溢出、企业数量和需求特征对非合作企业或研究联合体市场均衡的影响，发现非合作研发支出在社会最优水平下不足，而全行业研究联合体投资也低于社会最优，但可能比非合作体制带来更好的市场表现。
The authors investigate the effects of knowledge spillovers, numbers of incumbents, and demand characteristics on market equilibria involving either noncooperative firms or a research joint venture. Firms engage in cost-reducing R&D before competing in outputs. Noncooperative R&D expenditure is socially suboptimal with convex demand and likely to be so under general demand functions. A research joint venture involving all firms in the industry always invests too little relative to the social optimum. It may, however, lead to better market performance than is achieved under the noncooperative regime. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.