Wage and Technology Dispersion
解释为何机会相同的企业会采用不同技术并支付不同工资，关键在于工人需通过成本高昂的搜索获取工作信息；均衡中，部分企业采用高固定成本、高生产率技术并支付高工资，其他企业则相反。
This paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages. Our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs (Stigler (1961)). In equilibrium, some firms adopt high fixed cost, high productivity technologies, offer high wages, and fill job openings quickly. Other firms adopt less capital-intensive technologies and offer low wages, hiring mostly uninformed workers. In equilibrium, the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information, and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice. We show that worker search, which would appear to be a rent-seeking activity in partial equilibrium, may be efficiency-enhancing in general equilibrium.