The Influence of Takeover Protection on Earnings Management
研究收购保护如何影响盈余管理，发现收购保护降低了异常应计和损失确认的及时性，支持了“安静生活”理论，即管理者因保护而减少盈余操纵。
Abstract: We examine the relationship between takeover protection and earnings management. Existing theories suggest two contradictory effects of takeover protection on opportunistic earnings management: entrenchment theory suggests an exacerbating effect, whereas both alignment theory and quiet life theory posit a mitigating effect. We find that takeover protection is associated with lower levels of abnormal working capital accruals, lower levels of performance‐adjusted abnormal accruals and timelier recognition of losses. Further tests show that takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, which contradicts alignment theory but supports quiet life theory. The results suggest that takeover protection allows managers to enjoy the quiet life and thus mitigates earnings management.