Incentive effects in the demand for health care: a bivariate panel count data estimation
首次在计数数据中应用双变量随机效应估计器，检验了逆向选择（高风险个体更可能购买补充保险）和道德风险（自雇人士和幼儿母亲就诊频率更低），对研究医疗需求与保险激励的学者有参考价值。
Abstract This paper contributes in three dimensions to the literature on health care demand. First, it features the first application of a bivariate random effects estimator in a count data setting, to permit the efficient estimation of this type of model with panel data. Second, it provides an innovative test of adverse selection and confirms that high‐risk individuals are more likely to acquire supplemental add‐on insurance. Third, the estimations yield that in accordance with the theory of moral hazard, we observe a much lower frequency of doctor visits among the self‐employed, and among mothers of small children. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.