Capacity Utilization Under Regulatory Constraints
提出一种预测配额型监管约束对多产品利润最大化企业产能利用率影响的方法，通过虚拟价格模型进行事前分析，并以美国太平洋沿岸开放准入海洋渔业为例说明。
This paper presents a methodology for predicting the effect of quota-type regulatory constraints on capacity utilization for a multiproduct profit-maximizing firm. The approach builds on recent advances in the use of virtual prices to model the effects of rationing. This allows the effects of regulatory constraints to be examined ex ante. The methodol- ogy is illustrated through a case study of the imposition of output quotas in an open-access marine fishing industry on the Pacific Coast of the United States. The results suggest that, for certain species, output quotas can cause strong disinvestment incentives. have been used for many years to analyze the current status of the economy, the expansion- ary or contractionary forces on investment and inflation, and productivity movements. Tradi- tional CU measures were based on the notion of maximum possible output. Recently, economists have developed measures derived from the eco- nomic theory of the firm and based instead on a notion of optimal output (Berndt and Fuss, 1986; Hickman, 1964; Klein, 1960; Morrison, 1985, 1988; Segerson and Squires, 1990a). These measures assume that some inputs are quasi-fixed and that capacity utilization is determined by the level of the quasi-fixed input(s) relative to the level of output. Previous studies of theory-based CU measures have generally assumed that the industry under study was free from regulatory constraints. An exception is Morrison's (1988) study, which ana- lyzed (among other things) the effect of pollution-control regulations on capacity utiliza- tion in the U.S. and Canadian steel industries. The analysis is retrospective, however, since it studied the impacts of regulations that were al- ready in effect. In many cases, it would be useful to be able to predict the effect of proposed regulations on ca- pacity utilization. Such prospective or ex ante analysis would provide regulators with useful information regarding the likely effect of alterna- tive policies on investment incentives. For exam- ple, regulatory production limits on a single product (such as quotas) may cause multiproduct firms to change the volume and mix of their production, which could in turn change invest- ment incentives.1 Likewise, input use restrictions could affect both output supplies and the de- mands for unregulated inputs, thereby altering investment incentives. Predictions of these changes would contribute to designing more ef- fective public policies regulating capacity and in- vestment.