Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
在交替出价谈判框架下研究GHM产权理论，发现当管理者在谈判期间可从事其他职业时，GHM结论成立；但若接受最佳外部工作会终止谈判，则结论相反：有时重要投资决策者不应拥有其使用的资产，有时独立资产应共同所有，有时互补资产应分开所有。
This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) “property rights” approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-offers bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation, the GHM results obtain. If taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining, outcomes are very different. Sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with; sometimes independent assets should be owned together; sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately.