The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain
通过构建可信谈判模型，论证失业对工资谈判影响有限，工资更多取决于双方延迟成本而非外部市场条件，从而解释就业波动大于标准模型的现象。
When a job-seeker and an employer meet, find a prospective joint surplus, and bargain over the wage, conditions in the outside labor market, including especially unemployment, may have limited influence. The job-seeker's only credible threat during bargaining is to hold out for a better deal. The employer's threat is to delay bargaining. Consequently, the outcome of the bargain depends on the relative costs of delays to the parties, rather than on the payoffs that result from exiting negotiations. Modeling bargaining in this way makes wages less responsive to unemployment. A stochastic model of the labor market with credible bargaining and reasonable parameter values yields larger employment fluctuations than does the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model.