Takeover Bidding with Signaling Incentives
研究了在收购竞价中，掌握私有信息的竞标者为了向不知情的投资者传递高价值信号而进行投标，这种信号激励对投标、配置效率、各方利润以及胜出者收购后的股价表现和波动性有重要影响。
This study examines takeover bidding contests in which privately informed bidders have incentives to signal high values to uninformed investors through their bids. Such incentives could arise in a large number of situations from financing and managerial concerns. The findings show that the dynamic nature of the takeover contests plays a critical role in the signaling process, allowing bidders to signal high values in two ways. Such signaling bears important consequences on the bids, the allocative efficiency, the target's and bidders' profits, as well as the winner's post-takeover stock price performance and volatility. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.