Contracting with Nonfinancial Stakeholders and Corporate Capital Structure: The Case of Product Warranties
研究发现企业产品保修水平与杠杆率负相关，且这种关系在制造业中显著；有保修的企业债务水平最低，而无保修但所在行业其他企业提供保修的企业债务较高，无保修行业的债务最高。
Abstract We investigate the relation between a firm’s product warranty level and its leverage. We find that leverage relates negatively to the warranty level and that this relation is robust to controls for endogeneity and self-selection into offering warranties. The negative warranty-leverage relation obtains only in the subsample of firms in the manufacturing industries. We also show that firms with warranties have the lowest debt levels, firms without warranties but operating in industries where other firms offer warranties on average carry higher debt, and firms in industries where no firm offers a warranty have the highest debt levels.