分散化谈判中的工资相互依赖

WAGE INTERDEPENDENCE THROUGH DECENTRALIZED BARGAINING

Journal of Economic Surveys · 1994
被引 21
人大 AABS 2

中文导读

探讨行业工会工资相互依赖的根源,包括工会偏好、技术性质和价格需求决定,指出外部性和战略互补性导致次优均衡,引发通胀和失业,并暗示加强社会合作可减少失业。

Abstract

Abstract. The idea that sector‐specific unions are influenced by the wages obtained by other unions has mainly been used to support the empirical observation that wages are highly correlated among industries. The sources of wage interdependence can mainly be found in unions’preferences, in the nature of technology and in price and demand determination. The presence of externalities and of strategic complementarity among unions leads to suboptimal equilibria, which generates non‐desired inflation, unemployment and possibly also trade balance deficit. This enforces the idea that part of current unemployment can be eliminated by improving the cooperation between social actors.

工资相互依赖分散化谈判工会战略互补