维持卡特尔组织的成本

Costs of Maintaining a Cartel

Journal of Industrial Economics · 1987
被引 7
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了卡特尔组织在监控成员企业合规和检测欺骗行为时产生的成本,通过产出审查与触发定价模型分析这些成本如何影响社会福利。

Abstract

The costs of operating a cartel are determined by the effort spent on policing member firms and errors in detection of cheaters. An output review is modeled that may be used with tr igger pricing. In the presence of a Wiener process to describe distur bances in demand, the cartel uses trigger pricing first and then swit ches to an output review. Costs generated by cartel maintenance affec t social welfare and provide a foundation for analyzing the impact of a cartel on society. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

卡特尔维持成本触发定价产出审查社会福利