Managerial Incentives and Capital Management
指出，职业担忧而非偷懒会导致管理者与上级的风险偏好不一致，并基于管理者才能学习模型，发现最优工资合同是对其人力资本价值的期权，因此常需资本配给来抑制过度投资倾向，优于价格分权。
The paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors. A model, based on learning about managerial talent, is developed to study second-best contractual remedies. We show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager's human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager's resulting incentive to overinvest. Rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization, offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures.