Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking Behavior for Thrifts
研究1986至1995年间经理人持股、特许权价值与储蓄机构冒险行为的关系，发现监管宽松且特许权价值低时，经理人持股机构倾向于无利冒险，而监管严格且特许权价值高时则倾向于有利冒险。
This paper investigates the relationships among manager ownership, charter value, and thrift risk-taking for 1986 to 1995, a decade of significant regulatory change. We hypothesize that during periods of regulatory laxity and low charter values, manager-owned thrifts are likely to engage in unprofitable risk-taking. However, for periods of regulatory efficacy and high charter values, manager-owners are likely to engage in profitable risk-taking. In support of these premises, we find that manager-owned thrifts exhibit unprofitable risk-taking in the mid-1980s, years of regulatory laxity and low charter values, but demonstrate profitable risk-taking in the mid-1990s, a period of more stringent regulations and high charter values.