Unemployment Insurance and Job Quits
研究失业保险如何通过降低工人主动辞职、规避裁员的激励，从而增加失业。基于1979年青年纵向调查数据，发现福利增加显著但小幅抑制辞职。
We investigate an unexplored avenue through which unemployment insurance increases unemployment. As unemployment insurance benefits rise, workers lose incentive to "preempt" impending layoffs by changing jobs. We formalize this prediction in a job search model and investigate it empirically by estimating a proportional hazard model with data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, using state- and year-specific algorithms to compute each worker's expected unemployment insurance benefits. Our estimates reveal that an exogenous increase in benefits deters job quits by a small but statistically significant amount.