Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual- and Common-Agency Perspective
研究不协调借款的后果，分析国家是否及何时过度借款，并重新审视“原罪”争论，探讨股权组合投资、国际组合多样化、本币计价和长期限如何影响借款国的国际贷款准入，将准入水平与质量同国内储蓄、政治控制权等制度特征联系起来。
Studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing, the paper first looks at whether and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate. It then revisits the “original sin” debate, analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment, international portfolio diversification, domestic currency denomination and longer maturities enhance borrowing countries’ access to international lending. The paper thereby relates a country’s level and quality of access to international capital markets to a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings, their location, the extent of control rights held by political authorities, and the interests of dominant domestic political forces.