Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Employment History
研究在信息不对称且工人经历多次失业的情况下，最优失业保险合约应如何根据就业历史（特别是之前工作期限）来调整福利，以区分自愿离职与非自愿解雇。
In existing unemployment insurance programmes, it is standard to condition eligibility on the previous employment record of unemployed workers. The purpose of this article is to study conditions under which the efficient contract exhibits these properties. In order to do so, we characterize the optimal unemployment insurance contract in asymmetric information environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. We show that if quits cannot be distinguished from layoffs, it is optimal to condition the benefits paid to unemployed workers on their employment history, in particular, the coverage should increase with the length of previous employment spells. Copyright Copyright © 2009 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.