The Repo Auctions of the European Central Bank and the Vanishing Quota Puzzle*
研究了2000年6月前欧洲央行固定利率招标导致银行过度投标的现象，通过博弈模型证实固定利率的缺陷，并指出可变利率系统改善了流动性管理，但建议放弃最低投标利率以采用更对称的利率目标。
Abstract Until June 2000 the European Central Bank (ECB) used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions. A switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks. In this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon. Our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ECB's liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system. Yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ECB's practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target.