Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation
利用外生CEO离职事件，发现企业政策变动并无异常高波动，质疑经理人独特风格影响政策；内生离职后政策变动较大，且与候选人池深度相关，表明董事会预期到风格效应。
In a large panel of Compustat firms, we find that firm policy changes after exogenous CEO departures do not display abnormally high levels of variability, casting doubt on the presence of idiosyncratic-style effects in policy choices. After endogenous CEO departures, we do detect abnormally large policy changes. These changes are larger when the firm is likely to draw from a deeper pool of replacement CEO candidates, suggesting the presence of causal-style effects that are anticipated by the board. Our evidence suggests that managerial styles are not transferred across employers and that standard F-tests are inappropriate for identifying style effects. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.