When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game‐Theoretic justification for Non‐Game‐Theoretic Analyses
指出传统非博弈论分析与博弈论分析在公共财产开采问题上可能得出矛盾结论，并给出了两种方法结果一致的条件，对资源经济学研究者有参考价值。
Analyses of common property extraction under free access follow two distinct paths, traditional and game‐theoretic, giving rise to two standard methodologies. One methodology avoids game‐theoretic analysis by assuming that aggregate extraction in each period induces fel rent dissipation. The second methodology solves for the Marko‐perfect equilibrium of an n‐player extraction game investigating aggregate behavior over time as n → ∞. We show by example that these coexisting standard methodologies can yield conflicting predictions. We then provide conditions, relatively easy to satisfy, sufficient for the two approaches to yield the same predictions.