The Provision of Information in a Bertrand Oligopoly
构建了一个同质产品寡头垄断的两阶段模型，第一阶段决定向消费者提供信息的程度（无成本），第二阶段设定价格。发现一个完美均衡，其特征是信息不完全且预期利润为正。
A two-stage model of a homogeneous good oligopoly is constructed that is composed of a first stage determining (costless) information provision to consumers and then a second stage of price setting. A perfect equilibrium is found that is characterized by les s than full information and by positive expected profits. An alternati ve interpretation of the model is of firms deciding the proportion of contracts to tender for and then the prices at which the tenders wil l be made. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.