The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria
通过估计不完全信息时机博弈模型，研究商业广播电台播放广告的时机选择，发现电台倾向于同时播放广告，与广告商利益部分一致，但协调不完美，且协调激励在驾车时段和小市场更强。
Commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that stations' incentives are at least partially aligned with the interests of advertisers, although equilibrium coordination is far from perfect. Coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours, when more listeners switch stations, and in smaller markets.