A SIGNALING THEORY OF GRADE INFLATION*
当雇主无法区分学校是学生优秀还是给分宽松时，学校有动机给中等学生打高分，导致成绩膨胀。模型显示，无法承诺诚实评分会降低就业匹配效率，且一所学校的膨胀会传染给其他学校。
When employers cannot tell whether a school truly has many good students or just gives easy grades, a school has incentives to inflate grades to help its mediocre students, despite concerns about preserving the value of good grades for its good students. We construct a signaling model where grades are inflated in equilibrium. The inability to commit to an honest grading policy reduces the efficiency of job assignment and hurts a school. Grade inflation by one school makes it easier for another school to do likewise, thus providing a channel to make grade exaggeration contagious.