Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry
研究纽约市出租车行业，发现司机从同乡社区租车时，道德风险显著降低，驾驶表现改善近半个标准差，排除了筛选机制并探讨了其他可能原因。
This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of agents in settings with incomplete contracts. Specifically, the study examines the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers due to moral hazard. Using within-driver variation and instrumental variable strategies to remove selection, we find that drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly reduced effects of moral hazard, representing an improvement of almost one-half of a standard deviation of the outcome measures. Screening is ruled out as an explanation, and other mechanisms are investigated.