Optimal Protection of Property Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth*
将弱产权引入标准增长一般均衡模型，研究政府如何选择所得税率和税收在执法与公共服务间的分配以最大化增长率，并分析弱产权导致的多重均衡及次优政策含义。
Abstract We incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of growth and second‐best optimal policy. In this setup, the state plays two of its key roles: it protects property rights and provides public services. The government chooses policy (the income tax rate, as well as the allocation of collected tax revenues between law enforcement and public services) to maximize the growth rate of the economy. The focus of our analysis is on how weak property rights generate multiple decentralized competitive equilibria, the different properties of these equilibria, and the implications of second‐best optimal policies.