Ripoffs, Lemons, and Reputation Formation in Agency Relationships: A Laboratory Market Study
通过实验室市场数据，研究委托人无法观察代理人服务水平时的道德风险问题，发现代理人偷懒现象仅约半数发生，且看似有声誉的代理人常利用虚假广告欺诈委托人。
ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of the moral hazard problem in an agency relationship where the principal cannot observe the level of service provided by the agent. Using data from laboratory markets, we demonstrate that the presence of moral hazard leads to shirking by agents. However, this “lemons” phenomenon occurs only about one‐half of the time. While there is evidence of reputation effects in these markets, seemingly reputable agents are often able to use opportunities for false advertising to their advantage and “ripoff” principals.