International Trade Rules and Environmental Cooperation under Asymmetric Information
研究在环境政策的地方成本与国际收益信息不对称时，各国在谈判中过度依赖贸易政策控制跨境外部性，并发现限制单边贸易政策能改善环境协议的效果。
With asymmetric information about local costs relative to international benefits of direct environmental policy, countries will rely too heavily on trade policy in controlling cross-border externalities in negotiated agreements. The unilateral externality policy chosen before negotiations by an exporter provides a signal about its local cost, modifying the information used in negotiations. The greater the exporter's incentive to use an externality tax as a second-best trade instrument, the better the signal. Consequently, exogenous limits on the unilateral use of trade policy in the absence of environmental cooperation can diminish the informational problem and improve the performance of prospective environmental agreements. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.