X‐Inefficiency, Competition and Market Information
研究双寡头市场中，竞争是否通过改变经理人激励来影响企业X-无效率，发现成本相关时利用竞争对手行为信号可消除私人信息的影响，强调市场的信息作用。
Whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question. We consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs. In contrast to recent literature, we point out that, to have a genuine effect on firm X‐inefficiency, competition must change managerial incentives. By introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals' behaviour we show that, if costs are correlated, the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential. This result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work.