Fundamental Standards and Time Consistency
研究了即使善意且信息充分的政府也可能因代际成本收益不对称和时间一致性问题，无法克服基本标准选择中的市场失灵，并探讨了克服该问题的条件。
Recent literature showed that government intervention is important to overcome market failures in the choice of standards. This paper shows that even benevolent and well-informed governments may be unable to overcome such market failures if fundamental standards are concerned. Costs and benefits of changes in fundamental standards are asymmetrically distributed over generations. Intergenerational coordination aimed at changing a current standard will fail because of a time consistency problem. With a simple model and several examples from the history of conventions, the authors discuss the conditions that might help overcome the time inconsistency in standard changing policies. Copyright 1993 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG