THE EQUAL ABSOLUTE SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE REVISITED
综述了等绝对牺牲所得税的文献，将功利主义等牺牲标准扩展到广泛的基于排名的社会福利函数，发现税负取决于收入和分布位置，并探讨了累进性及横向公平的新概念。
Abstract We summarize the literature on equal absolute sacrifice income taxes, and make some extensions. We adapt the utilitarian equal sacrifice criterion to a wide class of rank‐dependent social welfare functions, and find that liabilities depend on both income and position in the distribution. We investigate whether such taxes need be progressive, using a combination of analytics and simulation, and in the process uncover tax functions not previously recognized as equating sacrifices. Finally, out of horizontal equity considerations a new concept of ‘the equal treatment of equals’ by an income tax emerges, with implications for future work whose significance is discussed.