The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from U.S. Firms
研究了美国小企业从多个集中债权人（如银行）借款时，如何差异化分配借款，发现资产价值高、同质性强、重组成本低、信息透明度高的企业差异化更明显，这有助于约束债权人和企业家。
When firms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they appear to differentiate their allocation of borrowing. In this paper, we put forward hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and test them using a sample of small U.S. firms. We find that firms with more valuable and more homogeneous assets differentiate borrowing more sharply across concentrated creditors. Moreover, borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to firms' informational transparency. The results suggest that the structure of credit relationships is used to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs, especially during corporate reorganizations.