Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources
研究企业总部如何在内部资本市场中通过“赢家挑选”方式将稀缺资金分配给竞争项目，即使无法缓解整体信贷约束也能创造价值，并指出总部管理少量聚焦项目时内部资本市场效率更高。
ABSTRACT This article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market. Unlike a bank, headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in “winner‐picking”—the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another. By doing a good job in the winner‐picking dimension, headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm‐wide credit constraints. The model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects.