Germany and the CAP: A Bargaining Model of EC Agricultural Policy Formation
构建了一个欧共体农业政策形成的讨价还价模型，揭示德国政治体制如何增强其农业利益集团在欧共体中的谈判力量，并解释共同农业政策价格支持波动的内在动力。
Abstract A bargaining model of EC agricultural policy formation is formulated. The model allows for more explicit consideration of political factors than is possible in standard political economy models. It shows how the political system in Germany has increased the power of German farm interests relative to farm interests elsewhere in the EC. The paper recognizes CAP negotiations are an on‐going process. Results of the previous bargaining round form the basis for the current round and give momentum to price changes. Understanding this momentum provides insight into the fluctuating price supports that have characterized the CAP.