Incomplete Contracts, Risk, and Ownership
构建了一个基于不完全合同、专用投资和风险的所有权模型，并用墨西哥服装分包数据检验，发现需求波动大时分包比例高，专用投资大时分包比例低。
This paper develops a model of ownership based on incomplete contracts, specific investments, and risk and tests the model using data on industrial subcontracting in Mexico. The choice of ownership structure involves a trade-off between minimizing holdup risk and spreading natural risk. Concentrating ownership under one party reduces her exposure to holdup but increases her exposure to environmental uncertainty. Using data on Mexican apparel subcontracting, the author finds evidence that supports the model: the share of production subcontracted is high in market segments where demand is highly variable and low in market segments where manufacturers make large relationship-specific investments. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.